Adversarial examples are intentionally perturbed images that mislead classifiers. These images can, however, be easily detected using denoising algorithms, when high-frequency spatial perturbations are used, or can be noticed by humans, when perturbations are large. In this paper, we propose EdgeFool, an adversarial image enhancement filter that learns structure-aware adversarial perturbations. Edge-Fool generates adversarial images with perturbations that enhance image details via training a fully convolutional neural network endto-end with a multi-task loss function. This loss function accounts for both image detail enhancement and class misleading objectives. We evaluate EdgeFool on three classifiers (ResNet-50, ResNet-18 and AlexNet) using two datasets (ImageNet and Private-Places365) and compare it with six adversarial methods (DeepFool, SparseFool, Carlini-Wagner, SemanticAdv, Non-targeted and Private Fast Gradient Sign Methods).
INTRODUCTION
An adversarial image is generated by perturbing the pixel values of an original image to induce a Deep Neural Network (DNNs) to fail in its classification task. However, most adversarial images are detectable [1, 2, 3] by defence mechanisms that use denoising algorithms, such as median filtering or bit-depth reduction [4] , or, when large distortions are generated, the adversarial images are noticeable to humans [5, 6] . Moreover, most adversarial methods operate under a white-box attack assumption and need to access the parameters of a specific classifier. Therefore, the resulting perturbations do not generally transfer across classifiers [7] .
Adversarial methods can be classified as constrained or unconstrained, depending on whether they generate bounded perturbations. Constrained adversarial methods [1, 2, 3, 6, 8] iteratively minimise an p norm of the perturbations. Non-targeted Fast Gradient Sign Method (N-FGSM) [1] and Private Fast Gradient Sign Method (P-FGSM) [2] generate an adversarial perturbation whose ∞ norm is constrained. DeepFool [8] and Carlini-Wagner (CW) [3] constrain the 2 difference between the original and adversarial image, while SparseFool [6] generates sparse adversarial perturbations based on the 1 norm. However, these adversarial images are easily detectable [4] and are not transferable [7] .
More recent adversarial methods introduce unconstrained perturbations, for example by randomly shifting hue and saturation values [5] , by transferring new textures to input images [9] or colourising [9, 10] . These adversarial methods are more transferable and less detectable than constrained adversarial methods, but unconstrained adversarial images may be severely degraded with unnatural textures or colours (see Figure 1(b) ).
In this paper, we propose employing an image enhancement filter to generate adversarial images, with the objective of reducing (a) (b) (c) Fig. 1 . Adversarial examples produced with unconstrained perturbations. (a) Original images. Adversarial images generated with (b) SemanticAdv [5] and (c) EdgeFool, the proposed method. Note the unnatural colours produced by SemanticAdv, and the enhanced details and natural colours produced by EdgeFool.
detectability and noticeability, and improving transferability. We achieve these contrasting objectives with a structure-aware adversarial perturbation that enhances image details. The proposed adversarial image enhancement filter, EdgeFool, learns the adversarial perturbation by training a Fully Convolutional Neural Network (FCNN) end-to-end with a multi-task loss, which includes detail enhancement and class misleading objectives. Using image smoothing [11] , the network learns to decompose the image, isolating the details from the more smooth image structures. Then, the network is guided to perform detail enhancement, to cause in a way that an incorrect classification is induced. The block diagram of the proposed method is shown in Figure 2 . We validate EdgeFool with object and scene classifiers on Im-ageNet [12] and Private-Places365 [13] using deep residual neural networks with 50 layers (ResNet-50) and 18 layers (ResNet-18) [14] , and AlexNet [15] . Experiments show that EdgeFool generates detail-enhanced adversarial images that are more transferable and less detectable than constrained adversarial methods. The code of EdgeFool will be made publicly available upon paper acceptance.
PROPOSED METHOD

Preliminaries
Adversarial methods aim to mislead a D-class classifier, C(·), by modifying the intensity values of an RGB image, I, and generating an adversarial image,İ, whose classification result, C :İ →ẏ, differs from that of the original image: where y is the predicted class of the original image.
For each of the D classes, the classifier C(·) predicts logit scores z = (z1, ..., zi, ..., zD) for I, where zi ∈ (−∞, +∞) is the logit score for class i. The logit scores are then normalised and the softmax is used to predict the probability pi ∈ [0, 1] of each class i:
where p = (p1, ..., pi, ..., pD) represents the probability of all the classes. The predicted class, y, is decided by a winner-take-all approach:
Adversarial image enhancement
We propose an adversarial image enhancement filter, EdgeFool, whose perturbations enhance details, preserve structure and maintain the original colours. EdgeFool decomposes I into its structural component, Is (Figure 3(a) ), containing smooth regions, and a residual component, I d (Figure 3(b) ), corresponding to image details:
We learn this image decomposition by training a FCNN [16] with a multi-task loss, L, which includes an image smoothing loss, Ls, and the adversarial loss, Ladv:
where the hyper-parameter α controls the relative importance of Ls and Ladv. The smoothing loss, Ls, measures the difference between the learned structure and an image representation that excludes high spatial frequency components, Ig, output by an 0 structurepreserving smoothing filter [11] :
Ls (Is, Ig) = Is − Ig 2 . We then avoid changing the colours of the input image and enhance the image details of the L image channel only, after conversion to the Lab colour space. The detail-enhanced adversarial image,İ (Figure 3(d) ), is finally generated by combining the channel with enhanced details,İ L , with the a and b colour channels of the original image, and then transforming the resulting image back to the RGB space:
where f (a, b) = 1 + e −ab −1 − 0.5 [17] , v1 is a constant value that adjusts the midpoint of the sigmoid curve, v2 and v3 control the slope of the sigmoid curves in I L s and I L d , respectively. As the range of the L channel is [0,100], the input to the sigmoid function is normalised by 100.
The adversarial loss, Ladv, quantifies the difference between the score of the adversarial imageİ belonging to the same class as I,ży, and the maximum score among other classes [3] :
whereżi ∈ż is the logit score ofİ for class i. We iteratively train the whole pipeline end-to-end by minimising L in Eq. 5 using the Adam optimiser [18] , until the generateḋ I misleads the target classifier and Ls < τ . We empirically set the threshold τ = 5e −4 to make Is close to Ig, enabling the separation of the details for enhancement. Figure 4 shows an example of a perturbation generated by Edge-Fool and compares it with the perturbations generated by state-ofthe-art adversarial methods applied to the same image.
VALIDATION
We compare the proposed method, EdgeFool, with six state-of-theart adversarial methods: N-FGSM [1] , P-FGSM [2] , DeepFool [8] , SparseFool [6] , CW [3] and SemanticAdv [5] . We apply these adversarial methods to three state-of-the-art classifiers: ResNet with 50 layers (ResNet-50) and 18 layers (ResNet-18) [14] , and AlexNet [15] on Private-Places365 [13, 19] and ImageNet [12] as scene and object datasets. The Private-Places365 validation set includes 3K images of 60 privacy-sensitive scene classes. The Im-ageNet validation set includes 50 images of different size for 1K classes. In order to perform the evaluation on all 1K classes of Im-ageNet and reduce the computational cost, we consider 3K images by randomly selecting 3 images per class.
Original
EdgeFool SemanticAdv P-FGSM DeepFool SparseFool CW Fig. 4 . Comparison of adversarial perturbations generated by different methods, namely EdgeFool, SemanticAdv [5] , P-FGSM [2] , DeepFool [8] , SparseFool [6] and CW [3] . Note that the constrained perturbations (second row) are scaled for visualisation.
We used the PyTorch implementations provided by the authors for P-FGSM 1 , DeepFool 2 and SparseFool 3 and implemented N-FGSM. We also implemented SemanticAdv in PyTorch based on their Keras version 4 , while we used Foolbox 5 for CW. We instantiate FCNN from the architecture implemented in [16] . The input size is 224 × 224 × 3. The FCNN architecture consists of 7 convolution layers with 24 intermediate feature maps and kernels of size 3 × 3. The last convolution layer applies a 1 × 1 convolution that generates Is. The dilation factors of each convolution layer are set to 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 1, and 1, respectively. Leaky Rectified Linear Unit (L-ReLU) is applied after padding and normalising each intermediate convolutional layer, except the last convolution layer. For the detail enhancement, we follow the parameters in [17] , v1 = 56, v2 = 1, and v3 = 15, which magnify the details by providing a steeper slope to the sigmoid curve for I L d . Also, we choose α = 10 for the loss function.
As performance measures we consider the misleading rate, transferability and detectability. The misleading rate is the ratio between the number of adversarial images that successfully mislead a classifier and the total number of images. Transferability is the misleading rate of adversarial images on a classifier that is different from the one that was used to generate the perturbations. Finally, detectability is the ratio between the number of detected adversarial images and the total number of images. To detect an image as adversarial we use the so-called feature squeezing framework [4] , which consists of applying median filtering and bit-depth reduction. An image is considered adversarial if the 1 difference between the D-dimentional class predictions of the image,ṗ, and its squeezed version exceed the threshold, which is defined based on the 1 difference of the original images and their corresponding squeezed images by accepting a 5% false positive rate. Figure 5 shows the misleading rate and transferability of N-FGSM, P-FGSM, DeepFool, SparseFool, CW, SemanticAdv, and EdgeFool against ResNet-50, ResNet-18, and Alexnet. The top circle and bottom circles indicate the misleading rate against the classifier that adversarial images are generated for and transferability to other classifiers, respectively. While most adversarial methods suc- EdgeFool is more transferable than other adversarial methods, except SemanticAdv that however severely distorts the colours (see Figure 6 ).
cessfully mislead a particular classifier, EdgeFool and SemanticAdv have higher transferability to other classifiers. For example, CW generates adversarial images that mislead ResNet-18 above 99%, while only 2% and 4% are transferable to AlexNet and ResNet-50. EdgeFool adversarial images generated for ResNet-50 have above 99% success rate on ResNet-50 and the SemanticAdv misleading rate is 93%; however, EdgeFool and SemanticAdv are 52% and 71% transferable to AlexNet. The higher transferability of SemanticAdv is due to the large colour distortions of the generated adversarial images. Table 1 reports the detectability rate of adversarial images for ResNet-50, ResNet-18 and AlexNet on ImageNet and Private-Places365. Median filtering and bit-depth reduction help detect the small but high spatial-frequency perturbations of constrained adversarial methods (especially P-FGSM and CW), while Seman-ticAdv generates the most undetectable adversarial images to median filtering, as it perturbs hue and saturation of all pixels by the same randomly-generated amount. EdgeFool is less detectable than constrained adversarial methods, but more detectable than Seman-ticAdv, as some of the enhanced (adversarial) details are smoothed out by the median filtering. Although EdgeFool and SemanticAdv are comparable in terms of the misleading rate and transferability, SemanticAdv perturbs each pixel more than EdgeFool and severely distorts the adversarial images as the colour changes are random (see Figure 6 and Figure 7) . SparseFool perturbs only a few pixels with large and prominent changes, whereas the adversarial images of EdgeFool contain adversarial perturbations, which enhance details. Table 1 . Detectability rate (↓) of N-FGSM, P-FGSM, DeepFool, SparseFool, CW, SemanticAdv, and EdgeFool on Private (P)-Places365 and ImageNet for ResNet-50 (R-50), ResNet-18 (R-18) and AlexNet (A) classifiers. For the Quantization (Q), we reduce the number of bits from 8 to 4-bit (4b) to 7-bit (7b). Smoothing (S) is a median filter with 2 × 2 (2m) and 3 × 3 (3m) on the adversarial images. Although SemanticAdv is less detectable than EdgeFool, its adversarial images suffer from unnatural colour changes (see Figure 6 and Figure 7 ).
N-FGSM [1]
P-FGSM [2] DeepFool [8] SparseFool [6] CW [3] SemanticAdv [ 6 . Adversarial images generated by EdgeFool and other state-of-the-art adversarial methods for ResNet-50 in ImageNet and Private-Places365. N-FGSM, P-FGSM, DeepFool and CW adversarial images are similar to the original images to human eyes, while they are detectable by defence frameworks and not transferable (see Table 1 and Figure 5 ). EdgeFool takes advantage of image processing filtering in order to generate structure-aware adversarial perturbations that enhance the details of the image. 
CONCLUSION
We presented EdgeFool, an adversarial image enhancement filter that trains a multi-task fully convolutional neural network to generate adversarial images whose details are enhanced. We evaluated EdgeFool in comparison to six state-of-the-art adversarial methods on ResNet-50, ResNet-18 and AlexNet classifiers using ImageNet and Private-Places365 datasets and showed that EdgeFool satisfies misleading, transferability and undetectability objectives. As future work, we will validate EdgeFool on other classifiers and with other datasets, as well as perform a formal subjective evaluation of the adversarial image quality.
